INNOVATION RESPONSE CAPACITY IN RELATION TO LIVESTOCK EMERGENCIES IN EAST AFRICA

Case Study of the Ethiopian Livestock Sector

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Acronyms/Abbreviations

ACDI-VOCA	-	Agricultural Cooperative Development International/Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance
ACTS	-	African Centre for Technology Studies
AU	-	African Union
CAHW(s)	-	Community Animal Health Worker (Systems)
CARE	-	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CBO	-	Community Based Organization
CSO	-	Civil Society Organization
CRS	-	Catholic Relief Services
DCM	-	Drought Cycle Management
DFID	-	Department for International Development
DoFLM	-	Department of Fisheries and Livestock Marketing
DPPA/B/C	-	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness – Agency/Bureau/Commission
EWS	-	Early Warning System
EFSR	-	Emergency Food Security Reserve
EWWG	-	Early Warning Working Group
EU/C	-	European Union/Commission
FAO	-	Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
FIC	-	Feinstein International Center (Tufts University)
GoE	-	Government of Ethiopia
IBAR	-	Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources
ICRC	-	International Committee of the Red Cross.
IDS	-	Institute of Development Studies (UK)
IFAD	-	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IIED	-	International Institute for Environment and Development.
IGAD	-	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.
ILRI	-	International Livestock Research Institute
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund.
LEGS	-	Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards,
LMA	-	Livestock Marketing Authority
LPF	-	Livestock Policy Forum
MDG	-	Millennium Development Goal
MoARD	-	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MoFA	-	Ministry of Federal Affairs
NDPPC/F	-	National Disaster prevention and Preparedness Committee/Fund.
NPDPM	-	National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management.
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organization
NRM	-	Natural Resource Management
OCHA	-	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
OFDA	-	Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance

OIE	-	Office International des Epizooties (World Organization for Animal Health).
PARIMA	-	Pastoralist Risk Management Programme
PCDP	-	Pastoralist Community Development Project (WB)
PCI	-	Pastoralist Communication Initiative
PFE	-	Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia
PPLPI	-	Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative
PRSP	-	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSNP	-	Productive Safety Net Programme
RVF	-	Rift Valley Fever
SC-US/UK	-	Save the Children – United States/United Kingdom
SPS	-	Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
USAID	-	United States Agency for International Development.
UNICEF	-	UN Fund for Children
WB	-	World Bank
WFP	-	World Food Programme
WHO	-	World Health Organization.

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Executive Summary

This study examined the innovation response capacity in relation to livestock related emergencies in Ethiopia. The main objective is to determine the capacity of the livestock sector to respond and adapt to drought and livestock related emergencies.

The report is divided into 8 chapters whose findings are as follows. Following an introduction, the first chapter highlights recent droughts and livestock related emergencies such as Rift Valley Fever. The chapter provides an understanding of how different the response to these emergencies is in an effort by different actors to achieve sector-wide capacity response, and how prepared some of them are to respond to such emergencies in the future. RVF has not been reported in Ethiopia, but in the neighboring countries of Kenya and Somalia. Early warning systems seem to be weak because the response is often directed to an already existing disease. There are regional strategies to control the disease in cases of an outbreak and to ensure that there is exchange of information between agencies involved. Also, new guidelines have been developed through several initiatives to improve livestock related emergency interventions.

The second chapter is on different actors and their roles in livestock emergency response. The focus is more on their motivation and competence in responding to drought, the synergy that exists between them and how they are building their capacity to respond to such other cases. The roles of different actors are dependent on either their mandates or on the coordination role of the government and other key agencies. Coordination ensures that various actors perform complementary roles and therefore some organizations do have to shift their roles when responding to the latest livestock emergency episodes.

The third chapter is on drought coordination systems and information management. The chapter analyses how emergency response is organized, the actors involved and the institutional arrangements governing coordination. This is discussed in the context of a centralized governance system which characterizes Ethiopia. This coordination role is mainly done by the government, through the Disaster preparedness and prevention agency/commission (DPPA/C). DPPA is the focal point for all other actors involved in livestock emergency response, but still gets support from other NGOs and UN agencies especially FAO which still coordinates some actions. Emergency response has been strengthened by linking various actors together, through forums, good trust relations and concrete networking systems. This has further been improved by community involvement and sourcing information especially on early warning systems, from the local levels.

The fourth chapter presents the evolutionary aspects of Community Animal Health Worker systems (CAHWs), the interrelationship between CAHWs, the government, the public and private veterinarians, the UN agencies and the livestock communities. The emphasis is put more on the new thinking of how to the system can be organized to offer alternative means of service delivery in a sustainable way. The system has been modified through partnerships and linkages to the veterinary drug supply for sustainability but this has not been strengthened to achieve status of regional response to livestock emergencies by the community animal health workers.

The chapter on livestock traders in disaster management gives details of the genesis of livestock trade as a livelihood based emergency intervention during livestock emergencies and how different this is being done currently. The livestock communities prefer the unofficial livestock trade because they lack the capacity to negotiate and overcome the burdens such as high tax rates which characterizes the official livestock marketing systems. The new thinking is in the ways of linking trade and animal health at the regional level, for purposes of exploiting the market potential in the region and the export markets.

Chapter 6 is on the livestock policy process. It gives the history of policy making in Ethiopia, then a comparison of the two approaches of policy formulation: One through the conventional expert led process described as top-down whereas the other is the unique –all-inclusive process that embraces community participation. The government currently supports the community based approaches to policy making. This approach has focused on various types of possible interventions. The approach was also all inclusive and action oriented because it gave the policy makers an opportunity to be involved in the livestock emergency intervention. This has helped other actors to improve on their capacity to respond such emergencies. The only weakness is that this system has not been adapted by all organizations.

In Chapter 7, policy processes or initiatives that link the livestock communities to policy makers emerged as a result of the criticism of the top-down approach, which was the conventional government led policy making process. Many civil society groups have since emerged both at local and international levels to represent the livestock communities. Most of them have different actors and are trying to build their capacity at different levels, to respond to livestock emergencies.

The last chapter is a summary of the lessons learnt from the study and the experiences of Ethiopia, and conclusions on some of the issues that can help various stakeholders to achieve a sector-wide response to livestock emergencies.

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1.0 Introduction

1.1. Ethiopian livestock sector

Ethiopia is considered to be the country with the largest livestock population in Africa. The livestock sector plays a critical role in Ethiopia's economy as it contributes greatly to the total GDP, foreign exchange earnings and to the livelihoods of the Ethiopian population in terms of provision of food, income, employment, draught power, organic manure, and traditional security systems.

The sector accounts for about 30-35 percent of the agricultural GDP and 12-16 percent of the total GDP (Halderman 2004). It is estimated that the livestock population comprises 44.3 million cattle, 23.6 million sheep, 23.3 million goats, 2.3 million camels, 6.1 equines (donkeys, horses and mules) and 42.9 million chicken (CSA[1] 2004).

The livestock communities (pastoralist and agropastoralists) in Ethiopia are mainly found in lowland regions of Afar, Oromiya, Somali, and the Southern regions. Others are in Gambella and Benishangul areas. The livestock communities in Ethiopia are characterized by dependence on livestock, grazing on natural pastures and mainly inhabited in the arid and semiarid areas. They account for about 12 percent .of the total population and use about 60 percent of the agricultural land.

These areas border other livestock communities in the neighboring countries and surround the highland communities. This makes them to be exposed to similar livestock emergencies just like the border countries or experience the same effects in case the emergencies occur in one of the countries.

The livestock sector has in the past experienced poor performance due to increasing population, drought, insecurity, encroachment of the grazing lands and water resources, competition with other agricultural activities, inappropriate livestock development projects and policies and political and economic instability. Other constraints include inaccessibility, poor infrastructure, and lack of basic services[2].

The areas experience frequent droughts with drought and disease outbreaks being major contributing factors to the livestock sectors poor performance.

1.2. Study background

The study employs the innovation systems approach to analyze the capacity of the livestock sector to respond to recent livestock emergencies in Ethiopia. It explores the ways of working and organizing different hard elements of capacity so that these elements work in a flexible and responsive ways. Central to this analysis are issues of innovation response capacity and changes in policy and policy processes due to dynamics of livestock emergencies.

[1] Central Statistics Authority (CSA) 2004. The 2001/2002 Ethiopian Agricultural Sample Enumeration (EASE), Executive Summary, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
[2] See Ghaffar et al on http://www.basis.wisc.edu/live/assets/assets02xxa.pdf.

To analyze innovation response capacity and policy processes the report follows the analytical framework developed by the World Bank to investigate agricultural innovation capacity (World Bank 2006). These include: the diversity of public and private sector actors and the appropriateness of their roles, the habits and practices of the various actors involved in the sector; patterns of interaction and the enabling environment that includes policies, infrastructure and market incentives for entrepreneurial activity.

The study looks at how various organizations relate to each other and how they bring to bear their underlying concepts on response capacity in relation to livestock emergencies with focus on recent drought and disease episodes. In terms of policy dialogue it examines key policies, programmes and processes to identify ways in which diverse actors were engaged in policy learning and knowledge sharing.

The rest of this report is divided into 8 main sections. Following the introduction, the first chapter provides an overview of the recent livestock emergencies in Ethiopia (RVF, Rift Valley Fever and the 2005/2006 drought episode). A description of actors that are involved in the drought management follows in Chapter 2. The next four chapters describe interventions in the management of drought episodes: drought coordination system (Chapter 3), "evolution" of community animal health workers (Chapter 4), role and activities of traders in newly devised drought management programs (Chapter 5), donor funded consortium active in the livestock emergency policy process to highlight operational aspects of a positive policy process (Chapter 6), an initiative to link livestock communities to policy makers/policy-making ("downward accountability") highlighting some of the shortcomings of conventional NGO approaches in linking with communities (Chapter 7). The final chapter (Chapter 8) draws out the lessons learned and principles for improving the design, capacity strengthening and policy response to livestock emergencies.

1.3 Recent episodes of livestock emergencies

Rift valley fever

Rift Valley Fever is an acute febrile disease of sheep, cattle, goats and humans that manifests itself with fever high mortality in the newborns, abortion in the pregnant animals and a hemorrhagic state. It is caused by strains of the *Phlebovirus* in the family of *Bunyavirus*[3].

Rift Valley fever is a transboundary animal disease especially in the Horn of Africa region. The increase in the virus activity and subsequent occurrence of the clinical disease in the region is likely to occur during the wet seasons (see Box 1). The predisposing climatic conditions that favor the breeding of the mosquito vectors

Box 1: Rift Valley Fever

RVF is endemic to the whole East African region. The outbreaks of the disease have occurred at fairly regular intervals of 10-15 years, and still have the potential to spread to other areas.

The RVF disease outbreaks are associated with above average rainfall (heavy rains and floods) especially following a drought period. Since the disease persists in the populations of mosquitoes, the heavy rains creates good breeding sites and enhance the hatching of the mosquitoes that increase the vectors, leading to the spread of the disease[4].

The recent outbreaks occurred in Kenya and Somali, but not Ethiopia. Interventions targeting Ethiopia were precautionary, and part of the regional responses.

The various actors that responded to the outbreak were: WHO, FAO, UNICEF, CDC, NGOs and the governments. Coordination of the response by other partners was done by WHO and FAO.

Control of the disease is through vaccination, but the two ways of vaccination have some negative effect of causing abortions in small ruminants and also turning virulent in some instances.

Source: Compiled by the author from the field notes and as indicated in Box 1.

of RVF tend to occur over large areas. Because of this and the cross-border animal movement in the region, there is likelihood for outbreaks to occur simultaneously in

[3] FAO Animal health manual 15: Preparation of RVF contingency plans

[4] See Otte et al., 2004– Transboundary animal diseases; Assessment of socio-economic impacts and institutional responses – Livestock policy discussion paper No. 9. and http://www.iprt.org/Dunn%20RVF%201998.htm.

adjacent countries. The reverse is also true with the onset of drier weather that suppresses the vector activity.

The recent RVF outbreaks in the region that have indirectly and directly affected Ethiopia are the 1998 and 2000 outbreaks in Kenya and Somalia and the 2007 outbreak in Kenya (Halderman 2004). There has been no reported outbreak in Ethiopia and therefore any strategies or interventions that have been put in place are just precautionary, to prevent the spread of the disease from the affected areas to Ethiopia.

To achieve sector-wide capacity response, several actors were involved in the intervention each participating in different activities. From the interviews it was evident that the main actors who responded to the RVF emergency were: the Government of Ethiopia, USAID, FAO and NGOs such as Save the Children among others. The government with the support from FAO, USAID and NGOs conducted a massive awareness and sensitization campaign. There was also a huge mobilization exercise to get reporting on the symptoms to border areas, by several actors. Pamphlets written in local languages about RVF disease symptoms were distributed by USAID and NGOs.

At the regional level, the organizations that responded to the outbreak were: WHO, FAO, UNICEF, CDC, NGOs and the governments. Coordination was done by WHO and FAO. These agencies together with their partners formed a regional task force which helped in the dissemination of information to other countries including Ethiopia[5]. (Inter-agency Standing-IASC Health Cluster, 2007).

One wonders why organizations mainly respond to an already existing emergency, rather than to early warning. There seems to lack an effective early warning system as regards the disease despite people's knowledge of what predisposes it. The professionals, policy makers, and pastoralists all know about the disease. According to an interview with Gijs Vant't Klooster of FAO: "…everybody knows about the risks and predisposing factors to RVF i.e., flooding after droughts". He further argues that early warning failures are due to sluggish responses and the long time lags between episodes.

According to the field notes, the main intervention that was used to control the disease was through vaccination, which was done either before an outbreak or during an outbreak. These two ways of vaccination (before outbreaks and early response vaccinations) had their limitations. The first way is not allowed by importers because of the fear of the vaccine turning virulent. The other way in which the vaccine could be administered as part of early response causes high abortion rates especially in small ruminants and this makes it unacceptable by the pastoralists[6].

The other hindrance to rapid intervention was the lack of quick diagnostic kits which could detect the disease early enough in both animals and humans so that any form of intervention could be instituted before the disease could spread to other areas.

[5] See also interviews with Dr. Ali Mekonnen, Food security Unit, and Dr. Tarakegn Tolla, Livestock advisor, Save the Children, US.

[6] Further reading on Veterinary vaccines and their use in developing countries available on-http://www.oie.int/eng/publicat/rt/2601/PDF%2026-1/LUBROTH_13-179202.pdf.

In preparation to respond to future outbreaks, the centre of disease control (CDC) is doing some research which could help unravel the uncertainty of some of the scientific aspects of RVF disease. Among the uncertainties are the possibilities of wild animals acting as reservoirs of the RVF virus. The researchers argue that the virus might be able to exist at low levels that would not result in disease development (Centre for Disease Control-CDC, 2008).

The impact that the RVF outbreak had on Ethiopia was the effect the disease had on livestock trade. RVF which occurs across the borders is a concern for both livestock traders and importing countries. The 1997/98 and 2000 RVF outbreaks in Kenya and Somalia led to the ban by Saudi Arabia and other countries from the Gulf region, on live imports from Ethiopia and the neighboring countries (Devereux 2006).

Trade issues during outbreaks are quite complex given the regional approach to animal health and trade versus the inherent cross-border trade. In this regard, some issues have been raised to COMESA, which is also involved in trade but not animal health. In our interview with John Graham, it emerged that through COMESA and other organizations such as AU, USAID is trying to support livestock trade and pastoralist livelihood. For example price negotiation is through COMESA which is believed to have the influence on regional trade issues. The other way would be through expansion of markets by engaging actors at the regional level through COMESA.

The recent drought episode of 2005/2006

Ethiopia has experienced droughts for a very long time. The livestock sector in the region is prone to emergencies which often result from cyclic droughts and associated disease episodes. The most memorable drought events in Ethiopia with devastating effects on the livestock sector were the 1973/74, 1983/85, 1995-97, and the 2000 droughts[7] (Ghaffar et al 2002). The most recent was the 2005/2006 droughts which mainly affected the South Eastern parts of Ethiopia (Pantuliano and Wekesa 2008).

There has been an increase in frequency and intensity of the droughts and this has resulted in increased vulnerability of the people and their livestock because of the short recovery time and the inability to cope with the droughts[8] (Devereux 2006).

This argument is also supported by some of the respondents interviewed: According to an interview with Mr. Mesfin Ayele of Farm Africa, drought: "…is not a phenomenon but is part of Ethiopians life. It has become more frequent and hence people have become more vulnerable. In the past, there was time of loss and then time to recover from drought. Currently, there is not enough time for recovery".

In terms of early warning systems, there was a system which did not respond early enough to the drought. This is evident from the long time lag between the early drought period (August) and the first drought response, especially the interventions that aimed at saving livelihoods, which arrived late, in July (Pantuliano and Wekesa

[7] See website- http://www.basis.wisc.edu/live/assets/assets02xxa.pdf.
[8] Further reading on-
http://www.virtualcentre.org/en/ele/econf_03_alive/downloads/s1_13_healthy.doc+livestock+policy

2008). This was due to several reasons. Dr. Berhamu Admassu of Tufts University during an interview stated that early warning systems during emergencies in Ethiopia was good, but was often hindered by delays in release of funds because of the donor requirements for the Government to do a rapid needs assessment and declare an emergency before appealing for funds.

Different organizations were involved in early warning and response. Cary Farley (Director of Regional Programs and Chief of Party ELMT/RELPA – CARE – Somalis/South Sudan) argued that there were some organizations which had a drought response classification system which was not fully tested and proved to be effective. The organizations also had different approaches to disaster management and therefore carried out different early warning responses. Some organizations have participated in the process of strengthening EWS and response systems at all levels (federal, regional and Zonal levels) during drought management

The activities by majority of the actors in response to drought were more focused on humanitarian aid with little being done on livestock. Initially if there was any livestock intervention, then it basically involved vaccinations and treatment. This was attributed to lack of standards or guiding principles on the type of intervention to be adopted by the various actors.

Later on, it was realized that animal health alone was not sufficient for livestock. It was also realized by majority of the actors that late vaccinations especially when animals were already too weak did not help because the animals did not develop resistance and in some cases they came down with the disease. This meant that improvement of the animal condition through feed and water provision was important during livestock emergency response. Later on, supplementary feeding of livestock was adopted as an intervention by many actors such as CARE, Mercy Corps, SC-US, ACDI-VOCA, Farm Africa etc (Pantuliano and Wekesa 2008)

As a way of protecting pastoral livelihoods, some NGOs undertook market oriented interventions. In Afar region for example, Farm Africa together with Oxfam were engaged in interventions such as commercial and slaughter destocking alongside other interventions. According to an interview with Mesfin Ayele of FARM Africa; “This was the first of such a livestock intervention”. During destocking, the breeding herd was targeted to protect the stock. Animals were put at Central places which acted as feeding centers. Alongside this, there were also emergency slaughter slabs where animals were slaughtered under supervision of veterinarians and the meat was utilized as either fresh meat or processed into dry meat and used as food aid. Other actors that were involved in the same activities include ACDI-VOCA, CARE, SC-US, SC-UK, MOARD and Tufts University. These interventions were among the pastoralist livelihood initiative (PLI) programme and were considered by pastoralists to be innovative and beneficial (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008). The PLI looked into issues of vulnerability and treated livestock as a diversified livelihood.

2.0 Actors and their roles in drought management

The typology of actor and their roles in this section is based on the following organizational category: Government (ministries and agencies), UN and Bilateral

Agencies, Non-governmental organizations, entrepreneurs (traders, banks and private veterinarians), research (universities, institutes, consultants) organizations and affected populations (see Table 1).

Government

The Government of Ethiopia is involved in different roles during interventions to livestock emergencies, under the different line ministries. The ministries and organizations concerned include: the MOARD, which hosts the DPPC, Ministry of Water Resources and the National Meteorological Services Agency (NMSA).

The government's roles were to provide the leadership and coordination functions. The DPPA/C in coordination with the livestock emergency unit in the Ministry coordinates interventions during emergencies by identifying activities and making appeals for humanitarian aid. During our interview with Mehbrat Alem, she said that the agency is also involved in the registration of NGOs prior to being allowed to carry out humanitarian assistance. Other roles according to her included licensing of veterinarians and involvement in early warning systems.

UN and Bilateral agencies

These include UN OCHA, UNDP, FAO, UNICEF, WFP and USAID among others. UN OCHA since 2001 has been the lead coordinator of humanitarian action. The agency helps in collection and analysis of information, supports the relief to development efforts and encourages coordination among other agencies (UN OCHA Ethiopia).

The UNDP on the other hand has the UN disaster Management team which is involved in contingency planning so as to achieve coordination in response. The agency also mobilizes resources and warns other agencies of possible disasters (UNDP– Emergencies Unit of Ethiopia).

FAO is more concerned with agricultural and livestock related interventions. The agency acts as the secretariat to the agriculture and livestock task forces in the MOARD. Its activities include convening meetings, coordinating actions and harmonization of interventions. USAID is involved in funding through programs such as pastoralist livelihoods initiative (PLI). The rest of the UN agencies are involved in either relief or developmental activities or both depending on their mandate. Even though good coordination exists between these agencies, this seems not to be regular but usually increases during emergencies (FAO- National Emergency Unit).

Non-governmental organizations

Many respondents interviewed revealed that several NGOs were involved in the response to the drought and livestock emergencies. These include CARE Internal, Save the Children, UK, AACD-VOCA, Merci Corps, FARM Africa, World Vision and CRS. During the 2005/2006 drought, some of their activities were livestock vaccinations and treatment (SC-UK, SC-US, FARM Africa, CARE), livestock destocking and restocking (SC-US, CARE, ACD-VOCA) development of early

warning systems and documentation of drought and disaster management (CARE, SC-US), and supplementary feeding of the affected population and livestock (FARM-Africa, Mercy Crops, CARE, SC-US, SC-UK, AACD-VOCA). Others were generally involved in relief work e.g. World Vision and IRC.

Entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurship has been evident in the Ethiopian livestock sector. Livestock traders played a major role during the response to the drought and livestock emergencies, through destocking and restocking. This created an opportunity for many actors especially the livestock producers who were able to acquire other household needs but at the same time protecting their livestock assets.

Apart from livestock traders, trade associations were also formed. Ethiopia livestock Trade Professional Association (ELTPA) was formed by Ethiopian livestock traders mainly fatteners, butchers, life exporters and traders. This was formed to promote international export as well as domestic market through creation of links between producers, traders, government bodies and NGOs.

Research Organizations

The main research organizations that were involved in the drought and livestock related research work include Tufts University, ILRI, and the Global Livestock Collaborative Research support programme (GL-CRSP) PARIMA Project. Tufts University did a research on the livelihood-based drought interventions in Moyale and Dire Woredas, followed by an assessment of the impact of commercial off-take relief interventions in the same region.

The GL-CRSP project conducted research on relationship between drought, high stocking rates and the effects of the two on cattle mortality[9]. From these examples it is evident that research has been in the forefront of creating new livelihoods especially in pastoral areas[10] (Pantuliano and Wekesa 2008).

Affected population.

Drought affected people are mainly pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, farmers and traders. These groups are all interdependent and there is no clear cut boundary between them.
It is apparent that in the past, the response to the livestock emergencies by majority of the actors was basically humanitarian/relief aid with livestock just receiving treatment and vaccination. With the devastating effects of the drought including livestock losses, there was need for a shift in the ways of responding to drought and variation of the intervention approaches so as to protect the livestock communities' source of livelihood. Since then, many actors have changed their mandates and incorporated the activities of the local communities and their needs.

[9] See also- http:glcrsp.ucdavis.edu/publications/PARIMA/04-04-PARIMA.pdf+livestock+policy+making+process+in+Ethiopia.
[10] Further reading on research in Coppock et al 2004: Pastoralism in Ethiopia and the Policy Environment; Linking Research, Development actors and Decision makers

Table 1: Actors and roles in livestock emergencies in Ethiopia

	Actor Category	Actors	Role/Activities	Partners
1.	Government/Public (Ministries and Agencies)	1. MOARD	The leadership and coordination function in drought emergencies. Facilitation and technical backing from the Tufts University	NGOs Tufts University
		2. DPPC/DPPA	Coordination with the livestock emergency unit in the Ministry and Coordinating Interventions during emergencies.	UN agencies
2.	U.N. and Bilateral agencies	FAO UNICEF UNIDO, WFP USAID [a]	Relief work (WFP) Humanitarian relief and development (FAO, UNICEF, UNIDO) Funding (USAID)	NGO's Government (PLI)
3.	Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)	ACDI-VOCA, Save the Children CARE International, Farm Africa Oxfam GB World Vision IRC, Merci Corps	Relief work (World Vision, IRC) Relief work and development program (Farm Africa, Oxfam) Research and documentation including Early Warning System (Save the Children US/UK), Farm Africa, CARE International. Trade and Credit financing (ACDI-VOCA, Merci Corps)	Other NGOs Government Community
4.	Entrepreneurs	Traders, Banks	Traders involved in destocking which was an opportunity for those in the marketing chain. Banks availed finances to build capacity of pastoralists.	Pastoralists NGOs e.g. ACDI-VOCA, Merci Corps
5.	Research Organizations	Universities Institutes and consultants	Policy and technical support(Tufts, IDS-Sussex Universities),ILRI Research on vulnerability and livestock sector(Ethiopian NARS	Pastoralists
6.	Affected population	Pastoralists [a]	Drought affected people are mostly pastoralists in distant and remote rural areas	NGOs CAHWs

Source: Compiled by the authors from field interviews and the web pages of relevant actors.
a:http://www.virtualcentre.org/en/ele/econf_03_alive/downloads/s1_13_healthy.doc+ livestock+policy

3.0 Drought Coordination System and Information Flow

National and regional policies in Ethiopia are always made by the ruling party, which from 1991 has been the Ethiopian peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (Halderman 2004). Ethiopia has a policy for disaster prevention and management. This was established in 1993 and it's through this that the government performs its roles or activities in the event of such emergencies. The disaster prevention and preparedness agency/commission (DPPA/C) is the very top organ or institution in charge of disaster management and has representation from all the ministries that are concerned. These same structures exist at all levels, that is, the system runs through from federal to regional to zonal and to Wareda levels (see Box 2).

Emergency response in Ethiopia is organized through the DPPC which was formed under the principles of the national policy for disaster prevention and management (NPDPM). The Principles entail the need for the Community to have an active role in disaster interventions, having a central point from which coordination of actions can be done and lastly having interventions in the order of priority from the most urgent and also focusing on the most vulnerable (Abate 2003).

The actors who were involved in Coordination and information flow were the DPPC departments at different levels, NGOs such as SC-US, SC-UK, CARE, UN agencies mainly WFP, UNICEF, FAO, USAID, Government organizations, for example, MoARD, National Meteorological Service Agency. The partners were mainly involved in reporting to the DPPC, participation in meetings/for a mobilization of resources and technical and material support.

The DPPA/C is organized in three systems comprising of National NGO offices, Early Warning Systems and Crisis Management Systems (see Figure 1). All the NGOs that were to work on livestock interventions had to go through the DPPA arm of Government for registration. According to an interview with Berhanu Admassu of Tutfs University, NGOs were required to register, pass proposals to and have access or provide information through DPPC. While this is good for coordination and to avoid duplication of activities, it reduces flexibility as well as creativity. In other words, NGOs do or continue doing things the way they have always done, according to the requirements of DPPC. On the other hand, this promotes internal learning and interactions between NGOs and other actors.

During livestock emergencies, there is always need for collaboration and especially some linkage between the DPPA and the MoARD on livestock interventions. DPPA being part of the government organizes emergency interventions with the livestock emergency unit at MoARD. This coordination was perceived to be good during the crisis, but later on there was confusion between DPPA and MoARD because their roles were not well defined (Pantuliano and Wekesa 2008).

As for Mrs. Mehbrat Alem of MoARD, coordination was part of the best practice of national guidelines such as veterinary care; livestock supplementary feeding, destocking and restocking that were developed by the animal health department. This was done to form synergies between all partners to maximize the impact of

intervention efforts. Apart from there being good coordination, DPPC also had full time staff and also got more from other departments in the time of an emergency.

On drought, a national structure and task force is in place which is a legally endorsed body with representation from all the Ministries and charged with the responsibility of disaster intervention. The agricultural task force is chaired by the MOARD while FAO gives the secretarial support. The DPPA organizes the interventions while FAO conveys meetings, coordinates actions and harmonizes the interventions. The MOARD together with the DPPA does the assessments while DPPA does the final verifications when all the actors have reported after which the regional task force issues an appeal for funds[11]. This shows how the system is organized and linked especially those involved in the policy dialogue. Dr. Tadelle Dessi, of ESAP/ILRI shares the same view about those involved in policy dialogue by saying "…everybody knows everybody and people are more interconnected internally, and through this, actors work closely together and know what others are doing, before developing policy recommendations in various livestock issues which are then given to the MoARD".

"The effectiveness of drought responses in pastoral areas could be greatly enhanced by more strategic coordination amongst the various actors. A number of coordinating bodies exist, but none provides overall leadership", says Cary Farley (CARE-Somali/South Sudan)[12].

To ensure effective coordination especially within the UN system, FAO has also tried an approach that brings the various actors together and make them work as a team but with the Government taking the lead (Pantuliano and Wekesa 2008).

Box 2: Coordination role of DPPC

Coordinating structure: Ethiopia has a National Disaster Policy –-a policy for disaster prevention and management (NPDP).Its organizational structure was enacted in 1994. The focal institution in its structure is the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA) operating under Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC). All the relevant government ministries (agriculture, water, health, etc) are represented in this committee. Within this structure, is the agricultural taskforce which is chaired by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) and the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) is its secretariat. These task forces operate at the federal, regional and (in some regions) at the zonal levels with similar composition. As a Secretariat, DPPC has three elements namely, NGO National office, National Warning System and National Crisis Management (see Figure 1).

NGOs national office: International and national NGOs go through DPPA for registration prior to being allowed to carryout humanitarian or any other kind of assistance. DPPA has been organizing emergency interventions with the livestock emergency unit at MoARD. Some of the NGOs involved include Save the Children-US/UK, CARE, ACDI-VOCA, and Mercy Corps. UN agencies include FAO, WFP, and UNICEF etc.

[11] Based on the interview with Gijs Vant't Klooster, National FAO emergency unit
[12] Interview with Cary Farley- Director of Regional Programmes and Chief of Party (CARE-Somalia/South Sudan).

Crisis Management: DPPA is part of the government that is responsible for making appeals for humanitarian aid. It is the central information centre responsible for assessing, declaring and preparing appeals. DPPA also identifies activities on humanitarian aid.

Early Warning System: Due to the knowledge gap on pastoralist issues, there was need to link information flow between national to local communities. This entails building capacity by training local people so that they can effectively respond to livestock emergencies. Some NGOs e.g. Save the Children (UK) has built capacity in early warning based on the regional collaboration with DPPB. Consequently, they are able to provide monthly updates.

The early warning activities mainly focused on warning on possible disaster and preparing for it, then at a later stage a follow up and assessment on the effects and outcome of the disaster. This was improved further by ensuring that information was sourced from all levels and establishment of a networking system which connected all the regions and zones. This helped to improve the capacity especially of the people at the local level to respond to livestock emergencies (Box 3).

According to an interview with Dr. Kassay Hadgu, of UN OCHA, "…DPPA is rather an early warning agency and hence their mandated coordination response is weak, but it has good coordination in assessments. Through the assessment by various organizations, what is required and what is missing is often identified. The NGOs then provide what is required but this is coordinated by the Government through DPPA".

Based on the field notes, many respondents are of the view that the system is top heavy in the sense that everything has to pass through the government administration. As such, it is effective in collecting, and preparing information for appeals. It is also strong in pooling organizations together, as seen during the previous drought and disease episodes.

In summary, DPPA/C is good in early warning coordination, but poor in early response. It is now perceived that coordination is more effective at the regional level where NGOs, communities, CAHWs, private entrepreneurs participate (see Figure 1).

One of the weaknesses of how EWS is managed is in the way the knowledge and information that is held by communities and NGOs is treated. The indigenous knowledge also has to be processed through the DPPA/C and the Wareda task forces. This leads to delays in early warning and hence does not build the capacity of local communities to respond to drought.

Box 3: Early Warning systems and Disaster Management in Ethiopia

The disaster early warning system is under the national DPPC. The EWS exists at national, regional, zonal and Woreda level all under the respective DPPC levels.

In this EWS, the information flows from the community upwards to the National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee and feedbacks get back to the community through the same channel.

This was developed to help link information flow between national and local communities due to the knowledge gap and it ensured that only those in need benefited from the interventions. Under the EWS, reports were prepared from the lowest levels and were then transmitted through their respective levels upwards to the national DPPC. The reports were prepared based on some specific indicators such as prevailing weather conditions, condition of livestock, forage availability etc.

The system entails building capacity by training local people so that they can effectively respond to livestock emergencies. Despite of this, this systems sometimes fails to achieve adequate drought early warning, due to lack of monitoring resources. Some NGOs such as FARM Africa, Save the Children- UK have tried to fill this gap by providing the required resources.

Source: Compiled by the author from the field notes.

In summary, there was good coordination at all levels and extensive support from many actors including UN agencies and NGOs. This was attributed to the good relations and trust between the major stakeholders with the government agencies. Donors also responded well due to the DPPC approaches to and the appeal for a timely response plus its perceived credibility by majority of the actors. These joint efforts further strengthened early warning in other areas such as nutrition, sanitation and health[13] (UN OCHA –Ethiopia).

Under the overall supervision by the DPPC Coordination forums held by the actors were important in enhancing the flow of information and harmonizing of their roles in emergencies. This made the interventions successful.

The weakness was evident in some instances, where there were delays in information flow leading to delay in response and other cases where information obtained did not add value to early warning activities and disaster management.

The other limitation was the lack of financial, physical and knowledge resources at some levels especially the Woreda levels. This created some gaps that could not make the disaster management exercise effective (Abate 2003 and Abebe 2005).

[13] For more information , visit OCHA On-line

Figure 1: Governance structure of DPPC



Source: Abate 2003

4.0 Community Animal Health Worker

Access to animal health services especially by the poor livestock keepers in Ethiopia has been limited by high cost of the services, inadequate funds for provision of the services by the government, poor infrastructure and inadequate human resource. Provision of these services to cover vast areas including remote area requires the intervention by community based approaches (Halderman 2004; Catley et al 1998).

Community-based animal health worker systems (CAHWs) originated in Ethiopia during the Rinderpest eradication campaign by the Pan African Rinderpest Control progamme (PARC) (see Box 4). This followed the need for an alternative way of providing veterinary services, to the rural remote areas. Initially there was government resistance to accept the introduction of the system in Ethiopia. It was until the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) intervened and endorsed the system that it became accepted by the government. This was followed by the training of the community animal health workers and the development of supportive policies. (Catley and Leyland 2002).

This government resistance, for some time resulted in slow progress in the adaptation of the idea. According to an interview with Gijs Vant't Klooster of FAO, there was no formal way through which the idea was disseminated, but it was only through individuals efforts by an informal networking process.

Since its initiation, CAHWs together with related projects e.g. PARC have brought together different stakeholders. The major actors linked to CAHWs in Ethiopia are AU/IBAR Tufts University, PACE, CAPE and NGOs such as SC-UK, SC-US, CARE, Ethiopian Veterinary Association, National Animal Health Research Centre among others[14].

The Rinderpest programs were key to the success of CAHWs: laid foundations relevant for shift from relief to development, designed procedures for training and monitoring of CAHWs and played advocacy roles in any policy changes which were involved. CAHWs have been successful in eradication of Rinderpest and delivery of animal health services during livestock emergencies. During Rinderpest eradication, the success was attributed to the use of thermostable Rinderpest vaccines. The other reasons were the rich indigenous knowledge of livestock communities on livestock diseases and the well organized indigenous pastoral institutions (Catley et al 1998).

The major function of CAHWs was to provide alternative veterinary services in pastoral areas. The problem was with the provision of weak veterinary services in the rural pastoral communities, because there were few trained veterinarians in rural areas. In an interview with Mr. Mesfin, Ayele, he noted that the Governments capacity to provide animal health services was weak. He gave an example of Afar region where there were few trained veterinarians in the region. Most of the veterinarians were from highlands and did not want to work in pastoral communities.

[14] See field notes. Further reading from- http://www.oie.int/eng/pulicat/RT/2301/PDF%20A-F-E/18.Catley.pdf.

Any past efforts to train and post veterinarians to such places failed and hence the need for recruitment and training of the local people.

Over time, the approach has taken a life of its own. Different NGOs and other actors have taken it differently. Experience has shown the importance of establishing CAHW systems as partnerships. This has led to new forms of partnerships. Many respondents interviewed shared their views on this. For example for purposes of sustaining CAHWs, they were given their initial capital in form of drug stocks by NGOs such as Save the Children and FAO. Later on they were linked to private pharmacies to ensure continued supply of drugs and delivery of animal health services. They also worked together with the government in cases of complex disease outbreaks which they could not handle on their own.

With the increasing need for provision of alternative means of service delivery in a sustainable manner, the trend for a long time has been shifting towards the establishment of private individual veterinary businesses. The system therefore has succeeded because of the close link between majority of the involved parties such as the government, CAHWs, veterinarians .The relationship was strengthened by the supply of drugs by the NGOs in an effort to make the system sustainable, incentives and the continuous training and monitoring (Catley and Leyland 2002).

Box 4: Making of the CAHW

The idea of Community-based Animal Health Worker (CAHW) originated from a Rinderpest eradication programme following a Rinderpest disease outbreak. Now CAHW system is accepted by the government and training has been put in place, plus a policy that supports it.

Key actors: Government, NGOs, Research organizations, Professional associations and Livestock communities are all involved in operations of this system of animal health delivery.

Community involvement: The CAHW systems offer alternative service delivery. In emergencies, they monitor drought situation and together with community traditional pastoralist indicators such as change in the moon, conduit of the animals, birds direction of flight, they establish their early warning systems.

Achievements of CAHWs: The CAHW System has led to elimination of some diseases in the pastoral areas. The community health workers have also been trained to handle issues of diseases and animal health. They indeed, provide services or respond to disease outbreaks in remote rural areas where the government and private veterinary service providers rarely go.

Challenges: The private veterinary practitioners did not embrace the training of the CAHW and perceived them as competitors rather than collaboration between the private veterinarians and the pastoralists. Sustainability of the system was also a problem. This was dependent on the availability and supply of the drugs

Source: Compiled by the author largely from the field notes.

Opportunities and Challenges

The CAHWs system has performed well and achieved much in terms of provision of animal health services. The community animal health workers have over time been dedicated to their work due to their close attachment with their communities. In terms of social capital, this has built good trust relations between local communities and the CAHWs (Hopkins and Short)[15]. Because of this, the system has also emerged as an entry point to other benefits unrelated to drought such as conflict resolution. Their approach has integrated animal health with other forms of interventions during drought and livestock disease emergencies (Catley and Leyland 2002).

It is apparent that the system has done quite well, but still issues of standardization of the system, institutional linkages, sustainability, management of the costs recovered and drop out rates are a hindrance to the system. Initially, the challenges they had were competition from private and government veterinarians. According to Dr. Braziri; "…CAHWs are perceived by private veterinarians as competitions". The system has been limited to provision of basic animal health services such as vaccinations, treatment of infections such as parasitism and use of common antibiotics.

The high drop out rates has been associated with the kind of incentives they get. Most of the time the incentives are not sufficient to motivate them during their activities. There is agreement that the system is still not sustainable. Sustainability of CAHW system has been affected by the low entrepreneurial skills of the workers such that some of them are not able to run their businesses after being given the initial capital in form of drugs and other basic equipment.

The community animal health workers base their services on the modern ways of animal health delivery. Because of this, the appreciation and use of traditional knowledge has significantly reduced (Hopkins and Short).

The argument therefore is that CAHWs approaches have done very well and need to be institutionalized as an alternative to formal veterinary services, other than the government and private veterinarians. In an effort to achieve sustainability, the focus is on how best this system can be changed to respond to the emerging needs for the development of livestock markets, as part of the shift from emergency to development. This has led to the efforts to try and strengthen their entrepreneurial capacity, by linking their animal health services with livestock trade.

[15] http://www.iied.org/NR/agbioliv/pla_notes/documents/plan_04505.pdf.

5.0 Traders in Newly Devised Drought Management Programs

Livestock trade has been in existent in Ethiopia for a long time. The only difference is that this has gained prominence and more actors have been linked to trade especially during droughts and other livestock emergencies. During the 2005/2006 drought, for example, traders did a commendable job by their involvement in market oriented interventions such as de-stocking and restocking. This is consistent with the current drought cycle management (DCM), and its four phases namely; normal, alert, emergency and recovery.

The concept of DCM was developed in Kenya and has now been adopted in Ethiopia by actors such as SC-US, ECHO, MoARD, and USAID. The aspects of livestock marketing come in the DCM at the alert and recovery phases through de-stocking and re-stocking respectively (Pantuliano and Wekesa 2008). Based on this, the traders have become the current focus of drought management efforts, given their livelihood based interventions as well as protection of their assets.

Two systems of livestock trade exist in Ethiopia. These are formal and informal trade. The cross-border trade is mainly informal; and operates through Somalia and Djibouti. The formal one on the other hand does not work well due to political issues in the region. During an interview with Mrs. Mehbrat Alem of the MoARD, she cited an example of a case where imports could be banned officially but the same animals become allowed for trade if they were informally transported over the border and exported via Djibouti or Somalia to Ethiopia's main export markets for livestock in Saudi Arabia and Gulf States (Halderman 2004).

According to many of the people interviewed, livestock trade in Ethiopia is governed by the MOARD and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI). From the field notes …Several actors were involved in livestock trade during the 200/2006 drought, and from then various actors were brought together through several initiatives. The main actors were; government, NGOs and the PLI partners. The government assisted the traders to get animals while PLI played a facilitatory role. NGOs such as ACDI-VOCA provided credit financing to traders and also assisted in transportation by transferring markets to accessible areas. The banks (Ethiopian Development Bank (EDB) and Commercial Bank) were mainly involved in the processing of loans (see Box 5).

To help overcome the diseconomies of scale and facilitate operations during trade, organizations or associations were formed and registered. First among them was the Ethiopian Livestock Trade Professional Association (ELTPA) whose members, were generally those engaged in the livestock marketing business, for example, butchers, life exporters and traders. The association aimed at promoting international export as well as domestic market by creating linkages between traders, producers, government bodies, MoARD and NGOs and creating awareness for the need to cooperate and realize the importance of such strong linkages through forums[16]. Despite the formation of such associations, traders were still exploited by the middlemen. This is true for Dr. Braziri, a private veterinarian, who sympathized with the producers and

[16] Interview with Dr. Braziri, a Private veterinarian.

said they needed fair marketing and people who cannot take advantage of their situation, because they are often exploited by traders and other middlemen.

Another example of associations that brought about linkages and pro-livestock trade initiative was the livestock pastoralist forum (LPF) project. The project worked with traders, NGOs and banks for credit management and to spread the risks. The professionals in the working groups of the LPF came from the public research, civil society organizations, NGOs, ADB, WFP, Mercy Corps etc. The policy guidelines that were identified by the LPF as part of market-based livestock interventions were destocking and restocking.

In an account with an LPF participant, it was evident that for the development of the guidelines, the group started with a work plan with a specific timeline. This was followed by literature review on the given guidelines and identification of possible gaps. Lastly, field assessments were done where successes and failures of the approaches were identified, before development and subsequent handing over of the guidelines, to the MOARD.

The biggest challenge was that policy at the time was not supportive of trade. This was due to the high taxation rates, alongside poor marketing infrastructure, lack of market information and other logistical constraints. There are still some government policies which hinder the producers in their trade activities. One good example of such Government policy is the customs authority strict control of trade in goods which have not been subjected to customs procedures. This discourages the informal cross-border trade (Devereux 2006).

There are lots of attempts by UN and bilateral agencies, and NGOs to bridge the gap and promote the cross-border trade. An example of such an attempt was from John Graham of USAID, who in an interview said that USAID was trying to push livestock trade to the regional level through IGAD, PLI and COMESA. This is through creation of the Djibouti quarantine facility and creating enabling environment in terms of policy, infrastructure and market. The whole essence of this is linking animal health and trade at regional level through development of policies that can achieve this, considering that there is an inherent cross-border informal trade which needs to be recognized.

The commercial destocking programme in Moyale and Dire Woredas is a good example of the shift from the usual food aid intervention to the livelihood based interventions during the 2005/2006 drought in Ethiopia. The source of motivation was the individuals' experiences of this intervention during the 1999 to 2001 drought in Kenya.

The actors who were involved were PLI Partners, the Department of Fisheries and Livestock Marketing (DoFLM) in the MoARD, NGOs such as Save the Children.
Their interaction was through various meetings which led to the formation of the Destocking working group. This together with awareness creation through media announcements sensitized the producers and traders of the need for increased commercial off-takes, especially in Southern Ethiopia (Catley et al 2007).

Box 5: Traders in drought management programmes

Entrepreneurship has been evident in the livestock sector during drought. With recent changes in concepts on drought and related drought management-cycle, livestock traders are playing a main role in de-stocking which is an opportunity for livestock owners, traders and others further down the marketing chain.

Several NGOs have been involved in livestock trade. They have enhanced financial service delivery to traders through NGO loans and NGO collaterals to banks. NGOs also helped facilitate transportation as well as linking the traders to abattoirs and butcheries.
The policy has allowed room for operation of several financial institutions and organizations which finance pastoralists during emergencies. However, the cost of financial facilitation is high and unaffordable to most of the pastoralists.

Trading opportunities and challenges
The policy is not supportive of trade especially the unofficial cross border trade, which is constrained by the multiple taxation, poor infrastructure, lack of market information and public health issues.

There are efforts by many actors to make livestock trade sustainable. The issue is how to arrive at a policy that links animal health and trade at regional level. This is because of the inherent cross-boarder informal trade which needs to be recognized. Alongside this is the effort to build the entrepreneurial capacity of CAHWs by linking them to markets and other agencies, to make trade a sustainable element.

To sum up, commercial de-stocking being the first intervention of its kind in Ethiopia resulted in good working relations between the various stakeholders and good linkages between the traders and the local communities.

Through loans that were given to the livestock traders for the destocking, animals including the worst affected by drought were bought and the remaining livestock were taken care of through feed supplementation and animal health services, thereby reducing the animal mortality rates.

In terms of weaknesses of the approach, it was evident that few traders responded to the opportunities of the intervention. The traders were limited by the availability of the financial resources which limited their capacity to participate in the emergency destocking. The destocking approach did not receive considerable support in regard to tax policies since they still paid multiple taxes on their way to the market destinations.

The innovative aspect of the commercial destocking intervention was the resultant increase in the off-takes, acquisition of generation of incomes from destocking which enabled producers to acquire other basic necessities such as food, clothing and payment of fees, reduced livestock mortalities and community involvement in livelihood-based livestock emergency intervention other than the usual food aid.

6.0 Donor Funded Livestock Emergency Policy Process

Policy making and implementation in Ethiopia in the past has been based on the centralized systems and structures that have been present for a long time as part of the country's culture. With the coming into power of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (DPRDF) in 1991, the policy making process/ decision-making powers were shifted from the central formal cabinet to the regional governments and the city administrations, as per the 1995 federal constitution (Halderman 2004). This process of decentralization by the EPRDF has encouraged participatory rural approaches to policy processes and therefore various regions develop their own.

It is apparent that the livestock sector had no specific policy on livestock. This point was supported by our interview with Mrs. Mehbrat Alem of MoARD who said, "Ethiopia had no specific livestock policy but operates under the MoARD policy on agricultural industrialization.

Literature informs us of there being two approaches in policy formulation in Ethiopia. One approach is product oriented while the other is a process oriented approach. The formal federal process is product oriented. While the bottom-up approach based in the regions is process oriented. Teshome (2007) in his assessment compares the two processes as follows:

> *"The formal, federal level process is expert led, Addis-based, donor influenced, with some civil society 'consultation', has strong policy "narrative", but lacks alternatives, lacks attention to regional/local specifics and is not known outside elite policy circles i.e. lacks ownership. The bottom-up process based in the regions entails, genuine participation of rural communities in generating ideas for agricultural transformation, triangulation of ideas with the scientific community and is informing and engaging policy makers and implementers".*

He emphasizes on the two approaches and the need for the latter by asking the question, "What difference does it make to Ethiopian farmers today if MOARD ceases to exist?"[17]

In responding to drought and livestock emergencies, this was an opening process for many policy makers and this was followed by different policy initiatives. In response to the 2005/2006 drought for example Berhanu Admassu of Tufts University, PLI/USAID indicated in the interviews that "there were no livestock related interventions except for treatments and vaccinations, but there was an urge for consideration of a policy process to trigger aid for the livestock sector". This then led to the establishment of the livestock policy forum and pastoralist livelihood initiative (LPF/PLI) as a way of introducing policy dialogue/ best practice guidelines and a livelihood–based relief intervention respectively. This initiative was to run for a two-year period.

This in our view was a departure from the norm, because initially policy formulation was a government activity aimed at a product. The response from several people

[17] See - http://www.future-agricultures.org/WDR/Ethiopia_case.ppt+livestock+policy+making+process+in+Ethiopia.

interviewed indicated that the focus was on the product, i.e. where various people came together, set the agenda, analyzed the situation, and came up with a product which they went to the field to test its performance in terms of success and failures.

The source of motivation or the shift in thinking was as a result of the individuals' experiences of working in drought affected areas especially the success of some of these approaches during the 1999-2001 droughts in northern Kenya (Catley et al 2007).

The actors involved in both initiatives were USAID, NGOs such as SC, ACDI-VOCA, CARE, IRC, Tufts University and government departments such as MOARD. Based on the response from many of the people interviewed, LPF was established through a dialogue process between the MOARD and Tufts University. The forum members included all implementers of livestock sector emergency activities and actors in the private sector, civil society and the government. The members identified terms and developed objectives for the forum[18].

On the specific roles of NGOs, Save the Children (US) was the leader of consortium, early warning systems was under SC/UK, IRC, CARE and Mercy Corps while ACDI-VOCA dealt with livestock marketing. The program was funded by USAID. Tufts University played a key role in policy and technical coordination[19].

Policy Process

Tufts University initiated the discussion with MoARD over the formation of LPF. The LPF was then established and this was followed by identification of the members from different organizations. The members were then mandated by the MoARD to identify the terms of the forum and the best practice guidelines for livestock-based interventions (see Box 6).

According to an interview with Dr. Berhanu Admassu of Tufts University, PLI/USAID, "the LPF identified five policy guidelines as a start of the policy process. These were:

1. Feed (supplementation) during drought emergency.
2. Emergency animal health (e.g. vaccination)
3. Livestock marketing support and de-stocking.
4. Re-stocking during recover phase.
5. Water and natural resource management

[18] Interviews with Dr. Berhanu Admassu, Tufts University, PLI/USAID, Dr. Tadelle Dessi, ESAP and ILRI

[19] See Interviews with Dr. Ali Mekonnen, Food security unit and Dr. Tarakegn Tolla, Livestock advisor, SC/ US

Box 6: Account of an LPF participant

This is an account of a participant from a leading international research institute (Tadelle Dessi, ESAP and ILRI, 2007), who was involved in one of the best practice guideline groups of the PLI/LPF – the USAID policy initiative. Tadelle led the re-stocking group. According to the participant the number of groups that worked on the policy guidelines was arrived at through consultations.

The composition of groups was voluntary. The process was managed by MoARD which requested organizations to appoint professionals to take part in the working groups. PLI was facilitator of the work and gave technical support. For example, in restocking, professionals in the group came from public, research, civil society, NGO, ADB, WFP, Mercy Corp, etc.

The participant joined the group to contribute from his disciplinary perspective. But during the process he actually learned a lot of new insights. Participants were free to join the group they found themselves most fitting, but incase of imbalances in any group size, some were asked to change into another group. This was a smooth process.

A meeting for each of the group was held every month –for over 8 months. The process through which the groups would develop the guidelines was also free for them to decide. The group started with work plan and a timeline, then did literature review on restocking -- they produced a CD and a report on literature which they then shared. One group went on a field trip to Afar, another to Borana and Somali. He noted this about the workshop, "…the workshop experience within the process is not documented as an evaluation but rather as a learning process".

This was done to track and to check on the past and present restocking activities by NGOs in order to learn about successes and failures. The group then developed the best practice guidelines through an outline and a write-up. This was followed by handing over of guidelines to the MoARD. The participant concludes by saying: "The group learned that there is a local restocking system in Somali. Here local institutions are very important because opinions of pastoralists he spoke with in the areas visited were not the same as what pastorals advocacy groups talked about."

The preparation of the guidelines was based on facts, and the process started from the grassroots and combined actions with the process of formulation, a concept he described as "seeing is believing".

The PLI was formed with an aim to "mitigate the impact of drought and other shocks by sustainably improving preparedness, livelihoods and incomes of pastoralists" in Ethiopia (Anon, 2005). Most people interviewed agreed that the initiative helped Ethiopia to build capacity in relation to emergencies especially drought and shortening of the drought cycle. They said PLI was involved in training of CAHWs in both emergency and development activities, commercial off-takes, establishment of private veterinary pharmacies and marketing channels, livestock terms of trade and pricing and natural resource management.

Uniqueness of the policy process and the initiatives

The process was donor funded, however one of its differences with the formal process was the wider scope or the variety of the components that made up the policy guidelines. This meant multiplicity of the actors including international NGOs, Tufts University and other partners. This was different from the formal process which was organized by the government. The circumstances also presented unique situation where policy making and emergency intervention were brought in the same arena.

Interaction/linkage was through a series of meetings among the stakeholders and later on awareness was made for the livestock traders about the need for increase in off-takes especially from the drought affected areas (Aklilu et al 2006).

Opportunities and Challenges

The LPF/PLI initiatives set a pace for the realization of the need or importance of the relief to development transition. Different actors witnessed the positive effects of a different drought intervention other than the usual food aid. This was confirmed by the communities' perception of destocking as one of the most useful intervention. Being first of its type, the process facilitated good working relations between the Government, MOARD, and NGOs and good linkages between the livestock traders and the local communities (Aklilu et al 2006).

In terms of learning, the meetings that were held by the various donors created a forum for knowledge sharing. This opened way for donor flexibility and hence they started identifying other types of interventions that would follow the livelihood based concept and a combination of both relief and development activities (Pantuliano and Wekesa 2008).

However, challenges that the PLI was faced with a low trader turn out rate. Few traders responded even after awareness creation. Majority of the traders were risk averse given their financial limitations. Multiple taxation was still a problem. (Aklilu et al 2006).

Two-year period was too short a time for good policy change given that learning is a long process. This is also supported by the fact that the initiative was operating in a complex pastoral environment and that it was development and livelihood-based. Moreover, the period was too short for one to think of a policy change (Pantuliano and Wekesa 2008).

Lessons learned on Innovation

From our perception, it may be useful to focus on this policy learning process versus the legal framework of policy making. It took a short time to change people's practices in terms of habits and attitude, towards policy making process, and in the end win them over. This process contrasts with the expected time of change in policy through the normal legal framework.

PLI through commercial off-takes reduced livestock deaths due to drought. The slaughtered animals served as an alternative food aid to the drought affected people. This was after the meat was preserved by drying and then later on distributed.

During animal health intervention, there was good collaboration between the actors, and coordination of the specific interventions such as vaccination and treatment. This resulted in an increased number of animals attended to hence reducing the disease prevalence.

Our view of the policy process therefore is that, the process focused on individual learning of the participating individuals. There seems no evidence of institutional change as a result of knowledge gained from individual learning. The point of reflection on innovation response capacity is therefore how to institutionalize this type of individual learning and adaptation and to what extent there is system wide policy learning and change.

7.0 Linking Livestock Communities to Policy Makers –Downward Accountability

The involvement of livestock communities in policy making processes is relatively new in Ethiopia. This was initiated through the poverty reduction strategy paper process which allowed civil society organizations to participate in the formulation of national policies, especially those on development of pastoral systems. However, there is still limited influence of CSOs in policy formulation (Halderman 2004).

In the past, NGOs both local and international based on their traditional operational mode and mandate, to fill the gaps that were not filled by the government for reasons of either the government being weak or absent especially at the local level. During emergencies, many of the organization provided emergency aid as the form of response or intervention. Other than their mandate, this also depended on the donor funding and the requests/needs of the affected population.

The policy process at the time focused more on the donors, but with little feedbacks to the livestock communities and concern about their interests. This then led to the establishment of the pastoralist Forum Ethiopia (PFE). This was initiated by pastoralist through lobbying by themselves. In an interview with Dr. Braziri, a private veterinarian, he confirmed that “PFE was an NGO consortium, combining pastoralists and other partners. The forum brought pastoralist issues to the surface to improve the profile of their communities. The idea was initiated by pastoralists themselves in 1995; during the Pastoral Concern Association Ethiopia (PCAE) gathering because they felt really underrepresented”.

In response to the criticism of the top-down approaches, a number of organizations emerged to embrace and preach bottom-up participatory approaches. Many civil society groups were then formed with an aim of representing the livestock communities and addressing their problems. To achieve this, and to improve response to drought and livestock related emergencies, initiatives were started, some of which linked livestock communities to policy makers. These included Pastoralist affairs

standing committee (PASC), the Pastoral community development project (PCDP) and Pastoralist communication initiative[20].

Pastoralist Parliamentary Standing Committee

This was established as one of the standing committees in the parliament to help the pastoralist have representation in the top decision making organ in Ethiopia. In an interview with Mr. Mousa Mohammed a consultant, he described the pastoralist's vulnerability in Ethiopia as being historical. He said "the pastoralists are on the periphery of decision –making in the government which is dominated by people from the highlands". The standing committee was established in 2003, and out of its membership (13), majority are from pastoral communities (Morton 2005).

The Committee was formed as a result of partnership with pastoralist, intellectuals, civil society organizations and the government. Through meetings and workshops with various stakeholders, the committee has promoted advocacy on various pastoral issues. The committee has achieved much in terms of ensuring pastoral parliamentary representation and protection of their rights by the constitution. Through this, issues affecting pastoralists can be presented and debated in parliament and then made into laws. Also there has been a lot of awareness on pastoralist issues both in and out of the parliament[21] (and Coppock 2004).

The major challenge is the inability of the committee to function outside Ethiopian context. This limits it when dealing with regional based livestock issues/emergencies. The information flow on some issues from parliamentarians to the livestock communities is still a problem given that the members of the committee are not easily available (Morton 2005). Through the committee good relationships have emerged between the government and livestock communities and hence the latter can directly be involved in decision making on issues that affect their lives at all levels[22].

Pastoral community Development Project (PCDP)

This was another livelihood based initiative that was aimed at creating an enabling environment for development of the livestock communities and their systems (Halderman 2004).
The actors involved in the project were IFAD, WB (donors) MoFA (coordination and supervision), and NGOs such as SC-UK (early warning systems) (Pantuliano and Wekesa 2008).

The project achieved much in terms of advocacy on pastoral issues such as livestock trade and marketing. Through collaboration with MoFA, the project tries to unite all actors concerned with livestock issues in pastoral areas. The project is unique in the sense that it shifted from the conventional top down approach to decision making which was characteristic of Ethiopia for a long time and adopted the community based approach which linked livestock communities to policy makers at all levels.

[20] See interview notes and Pantuliano and Wekesa 2008.
[21] And 18 - http:glcrsp.ucdavis.edu/publications/PARIMA/04-04-PARIMA.pdf+livestock+policy+making+process+in+Ethiopia.

Pastoralist Communication Initiative

The PCI project was funded by DFID and implemented by IDS Sussex. Other partners were AGHD and UNICEF. Because of its association with PCDP preparation, the additional actors were IFAD, World Bank, MoFA, SC –UK and CARE (see Box 7).

Box 7: Pastoralist communication initiative

The PCI works with the pastoralist to connect them amongst themselves and with the policy makers at the national and UN Levels.
The PCI plays a mediating role and enhances the relationship between the livestock communities and the policy makers.

Success of the initiative was due to discussions that took place between pastoralist groups and the government at all levels but more so at local level.

In terms of achievements, the initiative has played a leading role in formation of PASC, and PCDP. The initiative facilitates consultations which bring together actors involved in pastoral systems, enhances communication and linkages between pastoralists and their representatives. This helps to build trust of the pastoralists and to make the programs sustainable. The initiative is more focused on Ethiopia and therefore may not be better placed to deal with regional issues.

PCI plays a mediating role and more so promote dialogue among the stakeholders. Since two systems exist one comprising of pastoralists whiles the other compromising of policy makers at the national and UN levels, PCI tries to link the two systems.

Even though NGOs work with the local communities, a gap still exists between them since the latter have limited influence in policy making. According to an interview with Alistair Scot-Villier of PCI, "pastoralists are becoming involved in policy making, but they are often the last to be contacted during droughts. The PCI's aim is to connect pastoralists with policy makers".

In summary, the PCI initiative has achieved much in terms of creating proper linkages between pastoralists and policy makers. This has been due to the close consultations and good communication among the stakeholders[23]. This fact was supported by Mr. Abdi Omar of PCI who said, "the success of PCI activities is due to the involvement of pastoralists leaders/elders, letting the local people set and run the agenda and allowing them to host meetings where they discuss issues of importance to them.

The weakness of the initiative has been the inability to have an influence up to the regional level and also the difficulties in estimation of the benefits and costs of the initiative[24].

[23] Interview with Alistair Scott-Villier of PCI
[24] http://dfid web.gov.UK/prismodcs/ARCHIVE/ETHIOPIA/A50014 PG. Doc.- (PCI – Phase 2 Project Memorandum).

The unique aspects of the initiative is that , unlike most NGO's which brought together stakeholders in urban cities, PCI the makers and researchers together and meet in the pastoral communities, where they set and control the agenda.

8.0 Lessons Learned and Conclusion

This report has discussed drought and RVF episodes in the same context given that they both have interrelated underlying factors. RVF outbreak in Ethiopia often receives weak response from the livestock communities at both local and regional levels. Although there are attempts at development of regional response strategies, this appears to be because of the importance of the disease on cross-border livestock trade but not on individual national concerns such as public health and zoonotic implications. As discussed in chapter one on drought management, there seems to be an improvement in the type of interventions by various actors such as Farm Africa, Oxfam and Save the Children among others, as they are currently moving away from the usual relief aid to livelihood based and livestock related interventions. Even though the livestock related interventions such as destocking appear to be administered by the local communities, the enforcement is through the NGOs and government response activities. Such approaches if supported will improve the drought coping mechanisms of the affected people and reduce the impact of the drought.

Best on our discussion on actors and their roles, the roles of the different actors that are involved in livestock emergency response seem to be changing in these latest episodes of livestock emergencies. The actors who were effectively responding to drought were mainly livestock traders, some NGOs, the affected populations and the UN agencies. The shift of most of the organizations from their stated missions to expansion and involvement in other activities in response to livestock emergencies may be a sign of how they are learning to respond to the emergencies. These organizations include UNDP, FAO, research organizations and NGOs such as SC-US/UK, CARE. Such learning strategies if combined with the new interventions and policy processes can result in improvement in management of such disasters.

Coordination appears to be the central factor during livestock emergency intervention. Leadership and coordination of organizations involved in livestock emergency in Ethiopia is by the Government under the DPPA/C. As articulated by Gijs Vant't Klooster and other respondents, coordination on paper is done by the government but in actual sense, it calls in UN agencies during emergencies. This coordination approach which is centralized at the government level, as is the case, is good in making appeals and ensuring complementarity of roles, but weak in implementation of the responses. At the same time, information flow with system is mainly upward but with little flowing downwards. As Dr. Kassay Hadgu said in an interview, coordination can be improved through improvement in financial and physical resources at all levels, collaboration at all times even in absence of disasters and with some organizations working at the community level instead of the government.

There is evidence that CAHWs succeeded in the control of diseases such as Rinderpest and achieved much in the provision of veterinary services in terms of

affordability and availability to the rural livestock communities. The challenges they had were varied but more so the slow acceptance of the system by the government and competition from government and private veterinarians. To overcome these challenge the system is being developed as a partnership. The current livestock emergency interventions are channeling some support to CAHWs by linking them to markets and other key agencies so as to make the system sustainable. This has to be strengthened to support the relief to development efforts but also to achieve supportive policies which can link livestock trade and animal health to help the system to respond to cross-border livestock emergencies. Specific roles of CAHWs have to be defined and standardized, so that other actors can learn from the role and functioning of the system. This would also help to build trust relations, and raise their capacities to involvement in other interventions unrelated to drought such as conflict resolution.

Livestock trade has gained more prominence since its inclusion by some organizations in the drought and livestock emergency management. The governments' stand on cross border trade appears to favor the official livestock trade system as compared to the unofficial system which performs well. There are attempts to promote and encourage the cross-border trade through efforts by organizations such as COMESA, but the biggest concern is the lack of an effective policy which links livestock trade and related issues of animal health. Given the evidence of good relations between traders and livestock communities as a result of commercial off-takes, there is a possibility of improvement of the cross border trade if the government strategy shifts to development of a policy that combines livestock trade, security and animal health across the borders. The underlying issue is that despite the disconnect between the formal and informal trade systems, the livestock communities still exist at the centre stage because of their potential as the source of animals. Therefore they can play a bigger role in effectively addressing the `cross-border' livestock trade, animal health and peace/unity issues.

The introduction and support of the community based policy making process was a step towards achievement of policies on livestock emergencies. The actors who were involved took the responsibilities/needs of the affected livestock communities into consideration, by taking the process to the local level and encouraging their participation in generation of ideas and during field testing of the policy guidelines. For example, the process taken by PLI/LPF which involved change in attitude through going to the field, and interaction of different people with different backgrounds. As a result, NGOs were able to learn a lot from this process. This system helped various actors to build their capacity to respond to livestock emergencies especially through the multiplicity of the actors, the good linkages and working relations between them and the learning and knowledge sharing processes. In view of the fact that there is lack of institutionalization as articulated in chapter six, this process needs to be transformed and be adapted by various organizations as their approach to policy formulation and make it a permanent feature of policy making in the livestock sector, even in absence of livestock emergencies.

As discussed in section seven, there was a big gap between livestock communities and policy makers and their policy making process was not representative of the livestock communities' needs. The livestock communities then initiated linkages with policy makers through forums and later a lot of civil society groups emerged to represent

them. Some of them have been successful, for example, PCI. The reasons for success as captured by Abdi Umar, of PCI, were: Establishment of ways of learning, interaction and involvement of the communities. Such initiatives need to be supported so that they can articulate the priorities of the livestock communities and make the policy makers more accountable to the affected communities. In conclusion, based on the many problems facing the livestock sector in Ethiopia, there is need for learning and adaptation of interventions that focuses on strengthening the response capacity of the whole sector.

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